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Defeasible Rules in Content Selection and Text Structuring

Alistair Knott Mick O'Donnell Jon Oberlander Chris Mellish
Human Communication Research Centre, Department of Articial Intelligence
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
This paper outlines a number of ways in which defeasible rules can contribute to the
content selection and discourse structuring components of a text generation system. We
suggest that, for certain types of descriptive text, the characterisation of discourse struc-
turing mechanisms as operations on or involving defeasible rules provides an attractive
framework for addressing important issues in content selection/structuring. We describe
an architecture which incorporates defeasible rules into a systemic model of generation,
and illustrate its use in the description of objects in a museum gallery.
While defeasible rules are traditionally used in theorem-proving applications, to make
predictions about the consequences of known facts, we are here concerned with three
separate issues: (i) how such rules may need to be expressed by the NLG system in order
to achieve its goals; (ii) how their interaction with facts about particular objects enables
the use of valuable coherence relations; and (iii) how they are relevant in taking account
of the system's user model.
1 Introduction: the interaction of general and particular facts
in the museum domain
This paper describes aspects of ILEX-1, a text generator which operates in a museum gallery,
producing descriptions of a series of objects encountered during a virtual visit. The user of
the system is free to choose any objects in the gallery to look at, in any order; the goal of the
system is to produce an informative description for each object chosen, in such a way as the
sequence of object descriptions eventually produced forms a coherent whole.
One of the interesting issues which this domain allows us to explore is the way in which a
nite collection of objects can be used to make statements about generic classes of objects|
`generalisations'. Artefacts in a museum are often signicant wholly or partly in being
representative of larger classes of objects in the world: the important lessons to be learned in
a museum often relate to these generalisations, rather than to the actual objects seen. Human
learning hinges on the ability to use facts about particular entities to illustrate, test, or even
establish generalisations about classes of entities. The issue in the present paper is how best
to take account of this ability in users of the system|indeed, how to take advantage of it|
when structuring object descriptions. Our main suggestion is that a notion of defeasible
rules, as used in a number of nonmonotonic logics, can play a useful role to this end.

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We will begin in Section 2 by illustrating the benets of attention to generalisations in
the description of objects in the museum domain. In Section 3, we introduce the notion
of defeasible rules, which provides a means of representing generalisations with the right
properties for our purposes. In Section 4, we describe three possible uses for these rules,
for the generation of quantiers, coherence relations, and misconception corrections.
Section 5 describes a simple implementation of defeasible rules for these three purposes.
Finally, in Section 6 we propose a number of extensions of the current implementation, which
examine some intereresting interactions between these three areas.
2 The use of generalisations: an illustration
Consider the following two texts, each of which describes a necklace in an exhibition of 20th
century jewellery.
(1) This necklace is in the arts-and-crafts style. It is made of silver, amethysts and
pearls. It has very elaborate festoons. It has faceted stones.
(2) This necklace is in the arts-and-crafts style. It is made of silver, amethysts and
pearls. Arts-and-crafts jewels tend to be intricately worked; for instance, this piece
has very elaborate festoons. However, unusually for arts-and-crafts jewellery, this
piece has faceted stones. Most arts-and-crafts jewels (see for example the jewels in
case 8) have cabochon stones.
Leaving aside any improvements that might result from aggregation, or from denitions of
terms like festoons and cabochon stones, it should still be clear that the second example is
far preferable to the rst. This is true for several reasons. Firstly, Example 2 contains more
information than Example 1: it informs about the class of arts-and-crafts jewels as well as
about the particular jewel being described. This is likely to be the sort of material that
the museum curator is really trying to get across. Secondly, this additional material allows
a greater degree of cohesion in Example 2 than is possible in Example 1. In Example 1,
the propositions describing the properties of the jewel being viewed do not stand in obvious
relationships to each other; the most that we could do to improve the acceptability of the text
is to aggregate, which would tend to obscure rather than accentuate the interesting relations.
Finally, generalisations allow references to be made to other jewels that have or could be
described, and are thus helpful in weaving together a sequence of object descriptions into a
unied text. In the ILEX-1 domain, this is a particularly important function.
As should be clear from these examples, the use of generalisations, and of devices to signal
their interaction with particular facts, combine to produce a much richer representation of
the domain being described. In this paper we will be looking for a unied treatment of such
phenomena, to allow a NLG system to produce similarly rich descriptions.
3 Defeasible rules
The starting point is to nd a means of representing the semantics of generalisations. To
represent a universal generalisation is unproblematic; the quantied expressions all Xs are
Y and no Xs are Y can be used. However, many generalisations are vague, and admit of
exceptions; as Example 2 makes clear, we also need a way of expressing these.
Many formalisms have been proposed for capturing the semantics of generic expressions;
see for instance Carlson and Pelletier [3] for an overview. We will be adopting the terminology
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of Asher and Morreau's [1] commonsense entailment in what follows. In their notation, 's
normally  is expressed as 8x( >  ); the operator > is a primitive in the logic, tailored
for exactly this purpose, and the axioms of the logic are built around it. We will refer to
structures such as  >  as defeasible rules, and in the following we will refer to  as the
LHS and  as the RHS.
1
An example from the jewellery domain is given below:
2
(3) arts-and-crafts-jewel(X) > intricately-worked(X)
4 Three roles for defeasible rules
The communicative goals of the ILEX-1 system are of two sorts. Firstly, there are content
goals, which are goals to communicate to the user certain key facts about the domain.
Secondly, there are what we can call formal goals, which are goals to produce a text where
these facts are well linked together. Defeasible rules can play a role in achieving both types
of goals, as we will show in this section. We begin by considering the expression of defeasible
rules; we then consider their use in denitions of certain coherence relations; and nally we
consider their use in modelling reader misconceptions.
4.1 Defeasible rules and vague quantiers
The most obvious application of defeasible rules is simply to represent facts to be expressed.
According to the museum education professionals we have consulted, many of the important
content goals relate to the communication of generalisations, and so we need a simple method
for expressing them.
Perhaps the simplest way of expressing such facts is in terms of vague quantiers: the
expression most Xs are Y can be used to express X > Y and the expression few Xs are Y
to express X > :Y . Note that this suggestion is not trivial; in fact, it makes the powerful
prediction that a reader presented with expressions such as these will exhibit patterns of
reasoning consistent with the axioms of commonsense entailment. Such a hypothesis is rather
simplistic, particularly as there are signicant dierences between most Xs are Y and the
more standard generic Xs are normally Y; however, it leads to some productive suggestions,
and will be assumed in what follows.
4.2 Defeasible rules and coherence relations
A second application for defeasible rules relates to the system's formal goals, to link together
the facts to be expressed in a coherent way. Coherence relations are often used to this end,
and a number of these relations can be usefully dened in terms of defeasible rules. A number
of coherence relations function to link generalisations to particular facts; in particular what
we might call exemplification, amplification and concession as illustrated below:
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(4) Arts-and-crafts jewels tend to be intricately worked. For example, this piece has
very elaborate festoons.
1
The universal quantier will be dropped henceforth, but should be assumed.
2
More complex treatments of generic expressions, modelling the eect of focus on their interpretation (e.g.
Carlson [2], Krifka [8], Cavedon and Glasbey [4]) might eventually be used; we are still exploring whether these
will prove necessary in our domain.
3
We will take the presence or suitability of the three connectives in these examples as denitional of their
respective relations.
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(5) This piece has very elaborate festoons. Indeed, so do most arts-and-crafts jewels.
(6) Arts-and-crafts jewels tend to be intricately worked, but this piece has clean, geo-
metric lines.
Discourse theorists have often analysed exemplification and amplification in terms of
general rules: see for instance Mann and Thompson [10], and related discussion on implicature
in Hirschberg [7]. It only remains to be noted that these rules can be defeasible as well as
completely universal; the above examples each illustrate the former case. Recently it has
also been argued that concession should be analysed in terms of defeasible rules; see for
instance Grote et al [6], Overteegen [11]. According to these analyses, a defeasible rule can
either be explicitly stated in the satellite of a concession (the rst clause in the case above),
or presupposed, as in the following case:
(7) This piece is in the arts-and-crafts style, but it has clean, geometric lines.
Grote et al note several rhetorical uses for the concession relation, two of which are relevant
in the present domain. Firstly, they can be used simply to prevent an incorrect implicature
being drawn about a particular instance. If, for instance, we didn't add the second clause in
Example 6, the reader might think that the object being described was intricately worked.
Secondly, they can be used simply to inform about unusual circumstances in the world. While
objects in a museum sometimes serve to represent a generic class of objects (as mentioned
above), they can also be interesting precisely because they dier from the norm in some
respect.
4.3 Defeasible rules and the user model
Finally, defeasible rules serve a useful purpose in relation to the user model. In describing an
object or situation, it is necessary to take into account any misconceptions that a reader might
have about it; the way a fact is expressed often depends on whether or not it presupposes
such a misconception (see for instance the literature on negative polarity items). The point
is that these misconceptions often derive from misconceived generalisations; addressing these
is thus particularly important. Correcting such a generalisation can involve several types of
quantier and of coherence relation:
(8) Not all arts-and-crafts jewellery is elaborate. For example, this piece is quite plain.
Indeed, many arts-and-crafts jewels are plain.
Note that in an example such as this one both content goals and formal goals are being
achieved: the quantied expressions in the rst and third sentences convey important items
of content, while the exemplification and amplification relations each contribute towards
the formal goal of coherent text.
A more complex issue to consider is how a generalisation is reached on the basis of indi-
vidual instances. The reader's ability to induce generalisations on the basis of what he has
seen must be taken into account when keeping track of the user model; for instance, if he
has seen several elaborate arts-and-crafts jewels, the misconception addressed in Example 8
might be quite a natural one. Consider also the following sequence of descriptions.
(9) Description of J1: This piece was designed by Jessie King, in 1905.
Description of J2: This piece was also designed by Jessie King, but around 1910.
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How can we explain the but in the description of J2? Its function seems to be to alert the
reader to a dierence between J2 and J1, which needs to be made explicit in view of the
similarity noted in respect of their designer. So far, we have thought of but as signalling
a case where a defeasible rule is defeated. What might the defeasible rule be in this case?
Presumably, something like the following:
(10) If Jessie King designed it, it was probably designed in 1905.
What is striking about this defeasible rule is that it is not one which needs to be stated
explicitly in the text in order to be internalised. All that is needed is for the two facts `J1 was
designed by Jessie King' and `J1 was designed in 1905' to be expressed. It seems to indicate
that a defeasible rule can be internalised extremely quickly by a reader.
5 Generation using defeasible rules
In this section, we will describe the simple treatment of defeasible rules that is currently
implemented in ILEX-1.
5.1 The Knowledge Base
The ILEX-1 Knowledge Base (KB) consists of two types of objects: facts and rules. Facts
may involve either unary predicates (facts about types of objects, e.g. elaborate(j1)), or binary
predicates (facts about relations between objects, e.g.,made-of(j1,gold)).
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Rules can be either
indefeasible or defeasible and the LHS can only be satised by facts (there is no chaining).
Here we are only concerned with the defeasible rules.
5.2 Matching Defeasible Rules to the KB
One of the traditional problems with defeasible logics is their computational complexity; see
e.g. Lifschitz [9]. However, complexity only becomes a problem when defeasible rules are
used by a theorem-prover, to make inferences about what is not known. We are not in fact
using them for this purpose, and we thus avoid the complexity problem. We are only using
defeasible rules as a means of linking together existing facts abount an object. When we nd
an object for which both the LHS and the RHS of a defeasible rule hold, then we can express
not only the LHS and RHS independently, but we can also state that this combination of
facts is meaningful and expected, as in the rst part of Example 2.
When a defeasible rule is defeated, its LHS holds for a particular object, while its RHS
does not. The object is thus seen as an exception to the rule. This also is worth stating, as
in the second part of Example 2.
Two other results are possible: the LHS does not hold for the object, in which case the
rule does not apply, and nothing is to be said; or secondly, the LHS does apply, but the KB
has insucient information to conrm or deny the RHS. In the latter case, we could possibly
express a hedge; for instance, being costume jewellery, we would expect this jewel to be cheaply
made.
All matching of defeasible rules to the objects they generalise over is done as a pre-
compilation step, avoiding costly on-line calculation.
4
This is a simplication: the ILEX-1 KB actually uses a fully-edged typed unication system.
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This piece is in the
arts-and-crafts style.
Arts-and-crafts jewels
tend to be elaborate.
For instance, this piece
has elaborate festoons. 
DEFINITION
EXEMPLIFICATION
Figure 1: Discourse Structure for an Exemplification Relation
5.3 Expressing Defeasible Rules
When a jewel is selected, the content selection algorithm begins by nding all the simple
facts that can be expressed about the jewel. Then, for all of these, a search is made of
the defeasible/indefeasible rules which can be expressed in connection with these facts. For
a rule to be expressible, the general class about which the rule holds must be introduced
by a simple fact (as, for instance, in this piece is an instance of arts-and-crafts jewellery);
otherwise, the expression of the rule will have the appearance of an inexplicable change of
subject. The fact is then linked to the generalisation via the coherence relation definition.
The generalisation is then in turn linked back to another simple fact about the jewel, by an
appropriate relation: either exemplification (if a fact is found which accords with the rule)
or concession (if one is found which does not). An illustration of the discourse structure
created for an exemplification relation is given in Figure 1.
In the case of multiple facts which can be linked to a given rule, these are given as multiple
satellites of the definition relation.
A similar procedure is used for misconception corrections, except that the rules searched
are the mal-rules in the user model, rather than the rules in the domain KB. Only the
exemplification relation is currently used to provide counterexamples to misconceptions;
but the following section suggests some interesting possible extensions.
6 Further interactions between defeasible rules and quantiers
In the present section, the relationship between defeasible rules, coherence relations and quan-
tiers is explored in more detail, with a view to a more rened and theoretically interesting
implementation of the ideas mentioned above.
6.1 A classication of quantiers, including many
Until now, we have discussed cases where an object counts as an exception to a defeasible rule,
where a concession is appropriate, and cases where an object serves to falsify an indefeasible
rule which is mistakenly held to be true, where the quantiers not all or some are appropriate.
A third possibility should now be considered: if indefeasible rules can be shown to be untrue,
then so, presumably, can defeasible ones. But how might this be achieved? Clearly, providing
a single counterexample will not be enough; the whole point about defeasible rules is that they
admit of exceptions. And yet it is clearly possible that a defeasible rule can be mistakenly
held. So what are the criteria for deciding whether a defeasible rule is right or wrong in a
particular case?
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NL sentence Representation Description
All Xs are Y X ! Y indefeasible rule from X to Y asserted
No Xs are Y X ! :Y indefeasible rule from X to :Y asserted
Some Xs are Y :(X ! :Y ) indefeasible rule from X to :Y denied
Not all Xs are Y :(X ! Y ) indefeasible rule from X to Y denied
Most Xs are Y X > Y defeasible rule from X to Y asserted
Few Xs are Y X > :Y defeasible rule from X to :Y asserted
Many Xs are Y :(X > :Y ) defeasible rule from X to :Y denied
Many Xs are not Y :(X > Y ) defeasible rule from X to Y denied
Table 1: Rule-Based Denitions for `Vague' and `Precise' Quantiers
Some terminology would be useful at this point. It is confusing to talk about a defeasible
rule being `defeated' by some facts; this could either mean that the facts count as exceptions
to the rule, while the rule still stands, or it could mean that there are enough facts to suggest
that the rule is actually wrong. In this latter case, we can speak of the rule as having been
overturned; the term defeated will be reserved for the former case.
In order to overturn a defeasible rule Most Xs are Y, it is necessary to gather a certain
number of instances of Xs which are not Y . The hypothesis we propose here is that another
vague quantier, many, can be characterised as identifying just this number.
This is an attractive picture, because it provides a semantics for all of the principal
quantiers. All and no are used for asserting indefeasible rules. Most and few are used for
asserting defeasible rules. Some and Not all are used for overthowing indefeasible rules. Many
and Many. . . not are used for overthrowing defeasible rules. Table 1 presents a summary of
this picture of quantiers.
The denition of many Xs are Y as denying the defeasible rule X > :Y is central to this
classication. Two arguments will be given to support this denition, which both hinge on
the interaction between quantiers and coherence relations.
Firstly, note an interesting interaction between the relation of concession and the quan-
tiers some, many and most. It is quite legitimate to link most and some using this relation:
(11) Most art-deco jewels are geometric. But some of them are asymmetrical.
But it seems a little strange to use the relation to oppose most and many:
(12) ? Most art-deco jewels are geometric. But many of them are asymmetrical.
The intuition that this latter example is unusual would need to be tested empirically, as it
is not very strong. However, if the text does seem strange, then the proposed model can
account for it: the second clause would be seen as doing more than indicating an exception
to the rule expressed in the rst clause; it would be overthrowing it. In which case, it is not
appropriate to present the text as a concession. It would be more appropriate to present it
as a straightforward disagreement:
(13) A: Most art-deco jewels are geometric.
B: That's not true. Many of them are asymmetrical.
The fact that this seems to be a legitimate pattern of argument provides at least some support
for our denition of many.
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A second line of support is that the proposed denitions of quantiers gives a rationale for
the existence of another group of cue phrases, namely indeed and in fact. As has often been
pointed out (e.g. Grice [5]), these phrases are useful as blockers of quantity implicatures, and
are often used to replace one quantier with another further along the monotonic scale. For
instance:
(14) Many art-deco jewels are geometric. Indeed, most of them are.
The question is: why would a writer ever want to present the generalisation in two parts like
this, rather than just coming straight out with the stronger quantier? Such a policy becomes
easier to understand if the former statement is seen as countering an existing supposition, for
instance that few art-deco jewels are geometric.
This view is further supported by the suggestion that indeed does not operate transitively
along the scale of monotonically increasing/decreasing quantiers. There's something a little
strange about the following two texts:
(15) ? Most art-deco jewels are geometric. Indeed, all of them are.
(16) ? Few art-deco jewels are geometric. Indeed, none of them are.
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Note that the problem is not simply due to the fact that the clauses introduced by indeed
feature quantiers at the extreme ends of the scale. There are no problems with the following
texts, for instance:
(17) Many art-deco jewels are geometric. Indeed, all of them are.
(18) Not all art-deco jewels are geometric. Indeed, none of them are.
We now have a story which explains the dierence in the behaviour of indeed. According
to this story, the quantiers most and few are not used to overthrow rules (defeasible or
indefeasible), and therefore the implicatures which follow from them are hard to block with
indeed; whereas the quantiers many and not all can be used to overthrow rules (defeasible
for many, and indefeasible for the other two), and therefore indeed can be used to block the
implicatures which follow from them.
An objection to this account might be voiced on the basis of the complex quantiers most
if not all and few if any. These constructions are commonly seen as blocking implicatures
following from most and few respectively. However, these cases are signicantly dierent
from those using indeed mentioned above. In the conditional constructions, it is only the
possibility of the universally-quantied proposition which is asserted; while in the examples
with indeed, the quantied expression is asserted categorically. Thus in the examples with
indeed the implicatures are rst drawn and then cancelled, while in those with the conditional
construction they are prevented from being drawn in the rst place. This dierence points to
very dierent uses for the two kinds of expression. The conditional expressions are suitable
for use when the speaker simply has not encountered any exceptions to the generalisation in
question, be it positive or negative, but has encountered enough instances of it to be able to
arm it. This is quite dierent from the use of indeed discussed above.
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Note that with in fact (often a good substitute for indeed) these texts are a lot better. But we would
argue that this is because in fact can also be used to express a straightforward retraction of one claim, and
the assertion of an amended one (in which case it is often accompanied by an apology, or a qualication such
as Well. . . .)
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6.2 Choosing a quantier for misconception corrections
The eight quantiers listed in Table 1 seem to cover the eight possible attitudes to a rule quite
neatly. However, it should be noted that many of the possible attitudes can be expressed in
more than one way, using an alternative quantier coupled with negation. For instance, note
that instead of saying some Xs are Y to deny that X ! :Y , we could say not all Xs are
not Y, which in fact makes the denial of the rule more explicit. How might we decide which
version to produce when generating a text? This question will be addressed below.
6.2.1 Property-introducing and presupposition-denying quantiers
Some Xs are Y should in fact be thought of as ambiguous. It can either be seen as countering
the assertion that no Xs are not Y (as it has been analysed above), or simply as asserting a
positive statement, in the absence of any presuppositions. What can we say about its use in
this latter sense?
We suggest that when used in this way, without presuppositions, a quantier is better
understood in terms of a focusing account of text. If a writer is talking about one topic, and
wants to move to a related topic, it is awkward simply to begin a new sentence with the new
topic in subject position. Rather, the new topic should be introduced in a sentence about
the current topic, so as to show how they are related; the following sentence can then make
a smooth shift to the new topic. Now, imagine that the current topic is not a single entity,
but a class of entities, and the writer wants to talk about a property which belongs to some
of these. (Simply because it is an interesting thing to talk about.) The natural way to do so
is in a quantied sentence. When it comes to choosing a quantier, all Xs are Y, some Xs
are Y, most Xs are Y and many Xs are Y can all be used simply to introduce an interesting
property Y , in the absence of any presuppositions at all. But note that this is certainly not
true of no Xs are Y, not all Xs are Y, few Xs are Y and many Xs are not Y.
We would predict that the scalar implicatures triggered by property-introducing quanti-
ers are dierent from those triggered by presupposition-denying quantiers. If the writer's
main concern is simply to introduce an interesting subset of objects, rather than to make a
point about the size of this subset, we should not expect the choice of quantier used to do
so to carry as much signicance. For instance, if a writer simply wants a way to introduce
the property Y in the present general discussion of Xs, she might choose to say that some
X are Y when in fact many of them are, or many X are Y when in fact most of them are;
it simply wouldn't matter. As a consequence, we might expect readers to be less inclined to
draw scalar implicatures from a quantier if they recognised it as property-introducing.
6.2.2 Choosing between not all and some. . . not
An interesting consequence of the distinction between property-introducing and presupposition-
denying quantiers relates to the question of how to correct a misconception. We know that
some Xs are not Y and not all Xs are Y are truth-conditionally the same, for instance: both
forms can, according to the present model, be used to deny the rule that X ! Y . And yet, to
express a misconception correction, the latter expression seems far preferable. Imagine that
the reader has seen several art-deco jewels with faceted stones, but is now looking at one with
cabochon stones. Example 20 seems by far preferable to Example 19:
(19) Some art-deco jewels have cabochon stones. This jewel is a case in point.
(20) Not all art-deco jewels have faceted stones. This jewel has cabochon stones.
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The problem with Example 19 is simply that the quantied sentence is ambiguous between
the `introducing interesting properties' sense of some and the denying general rule sense.
Naturally, the sentence still does deny the rule. But this fact is very implicit. In Example 20
there is no such ambiguity, and the intended eect of the sentence is much clearer.
6
7 Conclusions
ILEX-1 is similar to many NLG systems in having to generate texts which satisfy both
content and formal goals. Somewhat to our surprise, we have found that the representation
of defeasible rules is essential for all of the following abilities:
 Achieving the educational goals of the system.
 Achieving text coherence through the use of varied and interesting coherence relations.
 Addressing the misconceptions that the user may have in advance or may develop during
the session.
The assumption of a knowledge representation scheme based around defeasible rules is becom-
ing vital to our research because this seems to be the most promising, if not the only, basis for
formalising the appropriate use of certain coherence relations and quantiers in descriptive
text. The role of defeasible rules in ILEX-1 is, however, not a traditional theorem-proving
one. Rather the rules serve as a way of binding together the isolated facts of the domain and
and allowing the user and the system to discuss their conceptualisations of the domain.
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